25X1

## Approved For Release 2053708708 EIA-RDP78S01932A000100050035-5

SCM 0 0 0 0 CLASSIFICATION	TO'S TPE MRO TR			P PAGES
message handling indicator 25X1D1	A DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE		MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
SOURCE REF:	R 1	4	7	10
	T 2 1 N G 3	5 6	8	11

MAY A.

THERE IS NO RELIABLE INFORMATION. HOWEVER. THAT BREZHNEV WILL
MAKE SUCH A VISIT. AS FAR AS HE KNOW, BREZHNEV'S CALENDARS IS
OFEN FOR THE BEXT HEEK. SO A TRIP TO THE HIDDLE EAST CARNOT BE
RELED OUT ON THE BASIS OF PRIOR COMMITMENTS. BREZHNEV HAS NOT
BEEN TO THE HIDDLE EAST SINCE SECONING PARTY CHIEF IN 1964. AND HE
SHERS TO HAVE MADE A SPECIAL EFFORT NOT TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF TOO
BIRECTLY IN THORNY MIDDLE EAST GUESTIONS.

THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS DEEN UNUSUALLY ACTIVE IN MIDDLE

EASTERN DIPLOMACY IN RECENT HONTHS. IN ADDITION TO ASAD'S VISIT

TO MOSCOW, GROMYKO HAS MADE THE TRIPS TO DAMASCUS. GRECHKO HAS

VISITED IRAG AND IS SLATED TO 60 TO ALGERIA SOON, AND LIBYAN

FRIME HIBUISTER JALLUD RECENTLY BAS IN MOSCOW. A TRIP BY BREZHMEY

UNIT THE OTHER TOP LEADERS TO DAMASCUS HOULD BE ABLOGICAL CONTINUATE

3 OF THIS SOVIET EFFORT TO ASSERT THEIR ROLE IN THE AMEA, ISOLATE

2 PRESIDENT SADAT AND CONSOLIDATE RELATIONS WITH SYREA.

THE PURPOSE OF A TRIP BY A SOVIET LEADER AT THIS TIME BOULD

DATE:
DATE: ORIG:
UNIT:
EYT.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

UTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

25X1

FORM 4C

USE PREVIOUS

Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP78S01932A000100050035-5

OUTGOING	MESSAGE e 2003/08/08 CIA-RDP78S01932A	
Approved For Releas	e 2003708/08 : CIA-RDP78S01932	k000100050035-5

DURCE REF:	CM O O	0 0 0		1 440 1	
ARGELY DEPEND ON THEIR READING OF THE STATE OF THE BUSENGAGEMENT  ALKS. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME MIRTS IN THE SOVIET PRESS THAT MOSCON  BINKS AN AGREEMENT IS NEAR. IF SO, THE SOVIET MIGHT EXPECT TO  IT SOME CREDIT IF A GOLAN AGREEMENT IS SIGNED WHILE A TOP LEADER  IN DAMASCUS. SUCH CREDIT, HEUVER, WOULD MAVE TO BE TALANCED  GAINSTE THE IMAGE OF A TOP KREFILIN LEADER IN A SUBSERVIENT ROLE  OF TECRETARY KISSINGER. THIS IS: A ROLE BREZHNEY WOULD PROBABLY  EXE TO AVOID.  ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SOVIET THINK THEY COMULD SUCCESSFULLY  BUILD UNDOUBTEDLY BE CAST IN THE PUBLIC ROLE OF OBSTRUCTING A  ESTILEMENT. BREZHNEY WOULD PROBABLY ALSO WANT TO AVOID THIS ROLE.  E WOULD ALSO WANT TO AVOID THE PERSONAL SETBACK IF HE WENT TO  ABASCUS WITH THE PURPOSE OF THWATTING A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.  NO IT WAS NONETHELESS CONCLUMED.  STICH CONSTRAINTS WOULD APPRLY LESS TO FOREIGH HIMISTER GROWNED.	MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR		CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE N	UMBER
REGELY DEPEND ON THEIR READING OF THE STATE OF THE DISENGACEMENT LEKS. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME MINIS IN THE SOVIET PRESS THAT HOSCOMINKS AN AGREEMENT IS MEAR. IF SO, THE SOVIET MIGHT EXPECT TO IT SOME CREDIT IF A GOLAN AGREEMENT IS SIGNED WHILE A TOP LEADER IN DANASCUS. SUCH CREDIT, HONEVER, WOULD HAVE TO BE MALANCED GAINSTE THE IMAGE OF A TOP KREMLIN LEADER IN A SUBSERVIENT ROLE OF IECRETARY KISSINGER. THIS IS: A ROLE BREZHNEV WOULD PROBABLY KEE TO AVOID.  ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SOVIET THINK THEY COMULD SUCCESSFIRLY REGH IN MITH THE SYRIAMS AGAINST AN AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME, THEY PURL UNDOUGHTEDLY BE CAST IN THE PUBLIC ROLE OF OBSTRUCTING A ENTILEMENT, BREZHNEV WOULD PROBABLY ALSO WANT TO AVOID THIS ROLE. E WOULD ALSO WANT TO AVOID THE PERSONAL SETBACK IF HE WENT TO ADASCUS WITH THE PURPOSE OF THWARTING A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, AD IT WAS NOMETHELESS CONCLUMED.  SUCH CONSTRAINTS WOULD APPRLY LESS TO FOREIGH MINISTER GROMYKO.					
REGELY DEPEND ON THEIR READING OF THE STATE OF THE DISENGACEMENT ALKS. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME MINTS IN THE SOVIET PRESS THAT MOSCOULINKS AN AGREEMENT IS NEAR. IF SO, THE SOVIET MIGHT EXPECT TO STANKS AN AGREEMENT IS NEAR. IF SO, THE SOVIET MIGHT EXPECT TO IT SOME CREDIT IF A GOLAN AGREEMENT IS SIGNED WHILE A TOP LEADER IN DANASCUS. SUCH CREDIT, HOWEVER, MOULD HAVE TO BE MALANCED SAINSTE THE IMAGE OF A TOP KREPILIN LEADER IN A SUBSEMPTION ROLE OF ECCRETARY KISSINGER. THIS IS A ROLE BREZHNEY WOULD PROBABLY ON THE OTHER HAND. IF THE SOVIET THINK THEY COMULD SUCCESSFIALLY CEGH IN MITH THE SYMIAMS AGAINST AN AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME, THEY DULLD UNDOUGTEDLY BE CAST IN THE PUBLIC ROLE OF OBSTRUCTING A STITLEMENT. BREZHNEY WOULD PROBABLY ALSO WANT TO AVOID THIS ROLE. WOULD ALSO WANT TO AVOID THE PERSONAL SETBACK IF HE HENT TO AMASCUS WITH THE PURPOSE OF THWARTING A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND IT WAS MONETHELESS CONCLUMED.  STICK CONSTRAINTS WOULD APPRLY LESS TO FOREIGH MINISTEER GROMYKO.	SOURCE REF:	0   1			
LECS. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME MINTS IN THE SOVIET PRESS THAT MOSCOMINKS AN AGREEMENT IS NEAR. IF SO, THE SOVIET NIGHT EXPECT TO STORE CREDIT IF A GOLAN AGREEMENT IS SIGNED WHILE A TOP LEADER IN DAMASCUS. SUCH CREDIT, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO BE MALANCED GAINSTN THE IMAGE OF A TOP KREMLIN LEADER IN A SUBSERVIENT ROLE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. THIS IS: A ROLE BREZHNEV WOLLD PROMABLY IKE TO AVOID.  ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SOVIET THINK THEY COMULD SUCCESSFULLY COMED UNDOUBTEDLY HE CAST IN THE PUBLIC ROLE OF OBSTRUCTING A STITLEMENT, BREZHNEV WOULD PROMABLY ALSO MANT TO AVOID THIS ROLE. E WOULD ALSO WANT TO AVOID THE PERSONAL SETBACK IF HE WENT TO ADDIT HE PURPOSE OF THWARTING A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, WHICH CONSTRAINTS WOULD APPRLY LESS TO FOREIGH NINGISTER GROMYKO.		2 G 3	6 9	- <del></del>	
LECS. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME MINTS IN THE SOVIET PRESS THAT MOSCOMINKS AN AGREEMENT IS NEAR. IF SO, THE SOVIET NIGHT EXPECT TO STORE CREDIT IF A GOLAN AGREEMENT IS SIGNED WHILE A TOP LEADER IN DAMASCUS. SUCH CREDIT, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO BE MALANCED GAINSTN THE IMAGE OF A TOP KREMLIN LEADER IN A SUBSERVIENT ROLE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. THIS IS: A ROLE BREZHNEV WOLLD PROMABLY IKE TO AVOID.  ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SOVIET THINK THEY COMULD SUCCESSFULLY COMED UNDOUBTEDLY HE CAST IN THE PUBLIC ROLE OF OBSTRUCTING A STITLEMENT, BREZHNEV WOULD PROMABLY ALSO MANT TO AVOID THIS ROLE. E WOULD ALSO WANT TO AVOID THE PERSONAL SETBACK IF HE WENT TO ADDIT HE PURPOSE OF THWARTING A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, WHICH CONSTRAINTS WOULD APPRLY LESS TO FOREIGH NINGISTER GROMYKO.					
RIG: HT:	THINKS AN AGREEMENT OF SOME CREDIT IF IN DAMASCUS. SUGAINSTR THE IMAGE	T IS NEAR. IF SO. A GOLAN AGREEMENT SUCH CREDIT, HOWEVER OF A TOP KREPLIN L	THE SOVIET MIGHT IS SIGNED WHILE EADER IN A SUBSE	EXPECT TO A TOP LEADER DE PALANCED RVIENT ROLE	
	FIEGH IN WITH THE BOULD UNDOUGTEDLY SETTLEMENT. BREZHN HE WOULD ALSO WANT DAMASCUS WITH THE AND IT WAS NONETHING	TAND. IF THE SOWIET  SYRIAMS AGAINST AN  HE CAST IN THE PUBL  NEV HOULD PROBABLY A  TO AVOID THE PERSO  PURPOSE OF THARTIN  ELESS CONCLUMED-	THINK THEY COMULA AGREEMENT AT THE IC ROLE OF 03STR LSO WANT TO AVOIL MAL SETBACK IF H G A DISENGAGEMEN	SUCCESSION THIS ROLE HENT TO	
	ON THE OTHER PAIRS ON THE UNDOUGTEDLY SETTLEMENT. BREZHN HE WOULD ALSO WANT DAMASCUS WITH THE AND IT WAS NONETHE SUCH CONSTRAIN	TAND. IF THE SOWIET  SYRIAMS AGAINST AN  HE CAST IN THE PUBL  NEV HOULD PROBABLY A  TO AVOID THE PERSO  PURPOSE OF THARTIN  ELESS CONCLUMED-	THINK THEY COMULA AGREEMENT AT THE IC ROLE OF 03STR LSO WANT TO AVOIL MAL SETBACK IF H G A DISENGAGEMEN	SUCCESSION THIS ROLE HENT TO	
	ON THE OTHER PAIR OF THE PAIR OF THE WOOLD ALSO WANTED AND THE	TAND. IF THE SOWIET  SYRIAMS AGAINST AN  HE CAST IN THE PUBL  NEV HOULD PROBABLY A  TO AVOID THE PERSO  PURPOSE OF THARTIN  ELESS CONCLUMED-	THINK THEY COMULA AGREEMENT AT THE IC ROLE OF 03STR LSO WANT TO AVOIL MAL SETBACK IF H G A DISENGAGEMEN	SUCCESSION THIS ROLE HENT TO	

use PREVIOUS Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP78S01932A000100050035-5

		SCM 0 *		СР ТОЙ	TPE M	RO TRI				
		MESSAGE HANDLIF	NG INDICATOR 25X1D		ATE-TIME GROUP		CITE	MESSAGE	REFERENCE NUMBE	RII
				IA	B I		4	7	10	11
		SOURCE REF			R 1 U 7 I 2 I 8 G 3		5	8	11	
	[		<i>v</i> .	7.4	<u> </u>	<u> </u>				
The first light										Ш
	L		·							
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	160.6					er e				$\mathbf{II}$
1 146 2 14 20								* 12: <b>6</b>		
e di At di		1				**				
		1								
	Ä.			. *		1. 100				
		distribution to Ministry			. I	ů.				
						97		* 1		
						tere proces		,		
						in the second se				
i	4									
	] 3			25X	(1A9A					- 4
	Ē				3 4					
	1				effect to	e e K		4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4		To any or any
1		DATE: ORIG:			1	• •				
1		UNIT:					÷			1 3
		EXT:			_		. 4	- 1		1 9
4				i.						1
is a		RELEA	SING OFFICER	ODUCTION B		THE ISSUING	OFFICE IS PROI		TING OFFICER	, -